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NOTES
Specific Performance of Separation Agreements-A New Remedy:
Moore P. Moore
In a case of first impression, the North Carolina Supreme Court
unanimously approved a decree of specific performance to enforce ali-
mony provisions of a separation agreement although the agreement
had not been properly merged or incorporated into a divorce decree.'
Prior decisions had held that breach of a separation agreement not
merged into a judicial decree would not subject the breaching party to
the contempt powers of the court,2 and that the only available remedies
were at law.3 Ms. Moore's request differed. She sought a decree of
specific performance-a significant intermediate step. A contempt or-
der could then follow for failure to comply with the terms of the court's
decree, rather than for failure to abide by the terms of the separation
agreement.4
Often a casenote discusses the manner in which a court reaches a
decision; others inquire whether a given decision or conclusion is justi-
1. Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735 (1979).
2. Because the North Carolina Constitution prohibits imprisonment for debt except in cases
of fraud, civil contempt proceedings are confined to enforcement of judicial orders. N.C. CONST.
art. 1, § 28. See Wilson v. Wilson, 261 N.C. 40, 134 S.E.2d 240 (1964); Stanley v. Stanley, 226
N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946). In Wilson, the court held that wilful failure to comply with the
court's order to pay support is contempt and can be punished by imprisonment without being an
unconstitutional imprisonment for debt. 261 N.C. at 44, 134 S.E.2d at 243. In Sianley, the court
stated that imprisonment for failure to pay a sum of money is prohibited except to enforce an
appropriate judicial order that has been disobeyed. 226 N.C. at 133, 37 S.E.2d at 120.
See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5A-21 to -25 (Supp. 1979) (Civil Contempt). Section 5A-
21(a) states:
Failure to comply with an order of a court is a continuing civil contempt as long as: (1) [tihe
order remains in force; (2) Itlhe purposes of the order may still be served by compliance with
the order; and (3) [tlhe person to whom the order is directed is able to comply with the order
or is able to take reasonable measures that would enable him to comply with the order.
Under § 5A-21(b), a judge may order a person in contempt imprisoned for as long as the contempt
continues.
Contempt issues are beyond the scope of this article, however. This article is written from the
assumption that before jumping the hurdle and approving orders of specific performance to en-
force separation agreements, the court looked for quicksand on the other side. The contempt
issues were adequately brought to the court's attention by both parties in their briefs. I assume,
therefore, that in reaching the Moore decision, the court made a simultaneous decision--that there
was no unconstitutional imprisonment for debt involved in ordering specific performance of sepa-
ration agreement provisions.
3. See notes 15-17 infra for the North Carolina statutory remedies.
4. See note 2 supra.
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fiable. "The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of
logic. . . .You can give any conclusion a logical form."5 But because
"only by happenstance will an opinion accurately report the process of
decision,"' 6 I prefer to follow a format explicit in the often-quoted phi-
losophy of Oliver Wendell Holmes: "The prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, is what I mean by
the law."7 This article will examine the "flavor" 8 of the Moore opinion
for the purpose of predicting how the court, tomorrow, may use this
decision, and will concentrate on what elements of Moore may be
viewed as relevant and important, and how these elements may be used
daily by the practitioner. Moore does not offer clear guidelines for de-
termining when the trial courts should order specific performance.9
The decision was grounded on the inadequacy of Ms. Moore's reme-
dies at law, but "[aldequacy is open-ended. . .[and] does not exist as a
matter of rule, but as a matter of fact."'" Because "[e]very decision
becomes a basis for future predictions,"" however, it is hoped that each
decision will embody at least methods of analysis that will serve the
profession as a guide to future decisions. Unfortunately, the Moore
court even limited its discussion of factors for determining the inade-
quacy of the remedies at law,' 2 and only summarily accepted the ratio-
nales of certain cases in other jurisdictions.'" The rationales of these
cases, however, indicate that the North Carolina Supreme Court favors
a liberal approach toward enforcing separation agreements by decrees
for specific performance.
A brief study of the Moore facts and opinion is necessary before the
availability of and the efficiency of this new remedy can be assessed.
Ms. Moore obtained a judgment in 1976 against Mr. Moore for
$1,500.00, representing six months arrearages in the alimony payments
that had been provided for in their separation agreement.' 4 Collection
5. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465-66 (1897).
6. K. LLEWELLYN, Ore in the Published Opinion, in THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 56-58
(1960). In an interview with Justice Potter Stewart of the United States Supreme Court, Justice
Stewart confirmed that the final published opinion of a court is the result of a committee effort
and includes "give and take" on the part of the Justices. Interview with Justice Potter Stewart,
Sept. 19, 1980. For a detailed, but not necessarily accurate, account of this process, see B. WOOD-
WARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979). See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 350-51 (1974).
7. Holmes, supra note 5, at 461.
8. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 6, at 56.
9. See notes and text accompanying notes 26-33 infra. If a court "attempts to answer" how
cases in the future should be decided at the moment they create a new rule or apply an old remedy
to a new situation, "it is not likely to answer ... wisely." Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 352.
10. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 60 (1973).
11. Rundell, The Judge as Legislator, 29 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. I, 10-11 (1958).
12. See notes and text accompanying notes 22-32 infra.
13. See note 33 infra for a list of the cases summarily approved in Moore.
14. See Record at 43, Moore v. Moore, 38 N.C. App. 700, 248 S.E.2d 761 (1978).
2
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 [1980], Art. 9
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol12/iss1/9
SPECIFIC PERFOMANCE
of the judgment proved unsuccessful: an execution was returned "un-
satisfied,"' 5 supplemental proceedings failed to uncover any assets
upon which to execute, 16 and an attempt to garnish Mr. Moore's wages
failed.' 7 In 1977, Ms. Moore accompanied a second action for addi-
tional accrued arrearages with a request for specific performance to
compel payments. ' 8 The trial court ruled irrelevant the testimony of
her destitute state and evidence of Mr. Moore's $20,000.00 annual in-
come, as well as evidence of his deliberate concealment of assets and
assignment of property to his second wife.' 9 The trial court denied Ms.
15. 297 N.C. at 14, 252 S.E.2d at 736. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-302 to -324.7
(1969 & Supp. 1979) (Executions). Where a judgment requires a money payment, it can be en-
forced by execution. Id. § 1-302 (1969). The judgment can be enforced by sale of the judgment
debtor's property, id. § 1-339.1(a)(3) (1969 & Supp. 1979), by following the procedures set out in
§§ 1-339.41 to -339.71 (1969 & Supp. 1979) (Execution Sales). But until the periodic payments are
reduced to judgment, there can be no execution. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 34 N.C. App. 201, 203, 237
S.E.2d 561, 563 (1977). Further, property held by entirety can not be subject to execution to
satisfy a judgment against only one spouse. Hodge v. Hodge, 12 N.C. App. 574, 575, 183 S.E.2d
800, 801, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 726, 184 S.E.2d 884 (1971).
16. 297 N.C. at 15, 252 S.E.2d at 736-37. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-352 to -368
(1969 & Supp. 1979) (Supplemental Proceedings). If no property can be found upon which to
execute, the execution is returned by the sheriff as "unsatisfied." The judgment creditor may then
elect to serve interrogatories on the defendant under § 1-352.1 (Supp. 1979). If the debtor does not
answer, a court may order the debtor to answer or, in the alternative, to request an oral hearing to
answer. Failure to comply with this order may result in contempt under § 1-368 (1969).
The creditor may also request the debtor appear and answer questions regarding his property
under § 1-352 (1969 & Supp. 1979). The answers are made under oath before the court or a
referee. Id. § 1-346 (1969).
A receiver can be appointed under § 1-363 (1969) and §§ 1-501 to -507 (1969 & Supp. 1979).
The purposes of the above proceedings are to discover and to reach any property of the debtor.
The trial court in Moore was willing to appoint a receiver to inquire into Mr. Moore's assets, but
Ms. Moore declined to pursue this remedy. See Brief for Appellant at 4, 5.
17. 297 N.C. at 15, 251 S.E.2d at 737. The remedies of attachment and garnishment for
enforcement of an alimony decree are provided for in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7(e) (1969), and
the dependent spouse is treated as a creditor for these purposes. Under § 1-440.2 (1969), attach-
ment of property may be had in any action for alimony or for maintenance and support if the
defendant is a nonresident or a resident who, with intent to defraud creditors or to avoid service of
process, has left or is about to leave or to remove property from North Carolina, conceals himself,
conceals or disposes of property, or is about to conceal or dispose of property. Id. § 1-440.3
(1969). Procedures under §§ 1-440.1 to -440.46 (1969 & Supp. 1979) must be strictly followed.
Garnishment is a proceeding ancillary to attachment. Id. § 1-440.21 (1969). But under § 1-362
(1969), there is an exemption for earnings for personal services within the last 60 days if the wages
are needed for a family supported in whole or in part by the debtor's labor. In Elmwood V. Elm-
wood, the North Carolina Supreme Court construed this exemption favorable to the debtor. 295
N.C. 168, 185-86, 244 S.E.2d 668, 678 (1978). Cf. the Editor's Note following § 1-362 (Supp.
1979). The Editor felt it would be reasonable to assume that when passed by the 1870-71 legisla-
ture, this section was intended to protect the wage-ea-ner's family from poverty as against the
claims of other creditors; it was not intended that a second family be supported at the expense of
the first family. The Editor urged the legislature to amend this section and to negate the result of
the Elmwood opinion.
18. 297 N.C. at 15, 251 S.E.2d at 737.
19. Id. Upon receiving his paychecks, Mr. Moore immediately endorsed them over to his
second wife, who deposited them in a checking account in her name. Real property was jointly
owned by Mr. Moore and his second wife. Personal property, including cars and a boat trailer,
was titled only in his second wife's name.
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Moore's request for a decree of specific performance and entered a sec-
ond judgment for approximately $5,000.00.20 The court of appeals af-
firmed, with Judge Webb dissenting.
2'
Writing the opinion for the supreme court, Justice Brock acknowl-
edged two general rules: (1) that separation agreements are subject to
the same rules of law as any other contract, 22 and (2) that the equitable
remedy of enforcement of contracts by specific performance is avail-
able only if there are inadequate remedies at law.23 More specifically,
he stated that remedies at law must be as full, complete, practical, effi-
cient, and prompt as remedies in equity.24 Focusing then on the partic-
ular situation before the court as a prime example of inadequate
remedies at law for enforcement of a separation agreement not incor-
porated into a judicial decree, Justice Brock described in detail the ex-
pensive, time-consuming procedures involved when a defendant
refuses to abide by a separation agreement: A plaintiff must wait until
arrearages accrue, file suit, obtain judgment, and seek execution-
probably many times over.25 Because the nature of an alimony con-
tract is for basic subsistence, he pointed out the extreme financial hard-
ships suffered by delay. Accepting factors enumerated in the
Restatement of the Law of Contracts26 for determining the adequacy of
these remedies at law, he concluded that delayed successive awards of
money damages are not the "substantial equivalent" of the periodic
payments for which the parties contract, and, therefore, the
"probability of multiple suits" is a sound basis for granting equitable
relief.27 He concluded that the evidence excluded by the trial court was
20. 297 N.C. at 15, 252 S.E.2d at 737.
21. Moore v. Moore, 38 N.C. App. 700, 248 S.E.2d 761 (1978). J. Webb dissented on the
basis that Ms. Moore had inadequate remedies at law and equitable relief was therefore proper.
Id. at 702-03, 248 S.E.2d at 762-63.
22. 297 N.C. at 16, 252 S.E.2d at 737. The usual remedy for breach of contract is, of course,
money damages. See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 993 (1951); 2 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1338
(1921); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contraci, 70 COL. L. REV. 1145-47 (1970);
Kronan, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHIC. L. REV. 351, 354 (1978). See notes and text accompa-
nying notes 15-17 supra.
23. 297 N.C. at 16, 252 S.E.2d at 737. Accord, E. FRY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE OF CONTRACTS § 48 (6th ed. 1921); J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE OF CONTRACTS § 4 (3d ed. with J. Mann 1926); 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 22, at
§ 1418 (1921); Kronan, supra note 22, at 355.
24. See Summer v. Staton, 151 N.C. 194, 197, 65 S.E. 902, 904 (1909). The typical situation
in which courts are prepared to order specific performance are situations in which the subject of
the contract is unique. For example, contracts for the sale of land, heirlooms, and antiques are
unique. See Kronan, supra note 22, at 357.
25. Ms. Moore followed these procedures and more. See notes and text accompanying notes
14-18 supra.
26. 297 N.C. at 17-18, 252 S.E.2d at 738. Subsection (c) of the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 361 at 646 (1932) focuses on the difficulty of obtaining a duplicate of the prom-
ised performance through a money award. Subsection (e) focuses on the probability of multiple
actions to obtain full compensation.
27. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 361(e) (1932). See also note 26 supra.
210
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indeed relevant 28 because it indicated Ms. Moore's hardships, 29 Mr.
Moore's ability to make payments, 3° and the necessity for, and futility
of, multiple actions (because of Mr. Moore's deliberate pattern of
avoiding execution of the judgment by assigning property to his sec-
ond wife).3 ' Justice Brock also found significant the absence of any
evidence regarding Mr. Moore's willingness to abide by the agreement
in the future.3 2 Accepting the rationales and holdings of numerous ju-
risdictions3 3 as sound support for his conclusion that Ms. Moore's rem-
edies at law were inadequate, Justice Brock concluded that a decree for
specific performance of a separation agreement neither incorporated
nor merged into a judicial decree was proper, both for accrued arrear-
ages and for future payments.34
Before the practical value of Moore can be fully appreciated, it is
essential to examine the pre-Moore procedures necessary to insure en-
forcement of alimony provisions35 of a separation agreement through
the contempt powers of the court. The purpose of holding a party in
contempt is to coerce compliance with the decrees of the court.36 The
contempt power is massive,37 but because the nature of the claim for
alimony is for subsistence, it has always warranted the exercise of this
special power.
As previously stated, a separation agreement not properly incorpo-
rated into a judicial decree is a contract, and is not directly enforceable
by the contempt powers of the court.38 By incorporating a separation
agreement into a consent order or a consent judgment, however, the
agreement becomes more than a contract between the parties; it be-
28. 297 N.C. at 18, 252 S.E.2d at 738-39.
29. See Record for Appellant.
30. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
31. Id.
32. 297 N.C. at 18, 252 S.E.2d at 739.
33. Strasner v. Strasner, 232 Ark. 478, 338 S.W.2d 679 (1960); Burke v. Burke, 32 Del. Ch.
320, 86 A.2d 51 (1952); Doerfler v. Doerfier, 196 A.2d 90 (D.C. App. 1963); Hagen v. Viney, 124
Fla. 747, 169 So. 391 (1936); Fleming v. Peterson, 167 I11. 465, 47 N.E. 755 (1897); Zouck v. Zouck,
204 Md. 285, 104 A.2d 573 (1954); Lorant v. Lorant, 366 Mass. 380, 318 N.E.2d 830 (1974);
Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 158 A.2d 508 (1960).
34. 297 N.C. at 19, 252 S.E.2d at 739.
35. Discussion in this article is limited to alimony provisions of a separation agreement and
does not apply to specific performance of child support or property settlement provisions of a
separation agreement.
36. See D. DOBBS, supra note 10, at 10.
37. Id. at 67. See note 2 supra explaining that contempt issues are beyond the scope of this
article, and why.
38. See note 2 supra regarding the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
[W]e can find no order of the court capable of implementation by a contempt proceed-
ing. . . . [T]he separation agreement. . . had no more sanction for its enforcement than any
other civil contract; certainly not that of imprisonment through civil contempt for noncompli-
ance. . . . The gist of the contempt is the willful disobedience to the court order.
Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 132-33, 37 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1946). See also 2 LEE, NORTH
CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 201 at 424 (3d ed. 1963).
5
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comes an order of the court enforceable by contempt. The require-
ments for boosting the status of the agreement are very technical,
however, and require careful drafting.39 The court must do more than
merely acknowledge40 or approve 4' the separation agreement in the
consent order. If the order specifically states that the parties are subject
to the contempt powers of the court,42 expressly leaves the order open
for modification by the court,43 or expressly orders payments to be
made,44 the separation agreement is deemed merged or incorporated
into the order and it is enforceable by contempt. Also, by merging the
separation agreement into a judgment by confession, 45 the separation
agreement is converted into a judgment enforceable by contempt.
Prior to Moore, if the above incorporation procedures were not care-
fully followed, only breach of contract remedies at law were available,
39. [T]he subleties in the form of a consent judgment for support payments to the wife play
a major role in determining the subsequent rights of the parties and, if the judgment is to be
of practical value to the wife other than as a judicial affirmation of the contract existing
between the parties, . . . it is advisable that the attorney carefully word the form of the
judgment so as to preserve in the court further rights in the cause.
Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 70, 136 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964). Bunn is the landmark case in North
Carolina dealing with whether consent judgments are contracts or consent orders. See Note, Do-
mestic Relations-Consent Judgments for Alimony-Subsequent Modiflcation and Enforcement by
Contempt, 35 N.C.L. REV. 405,409 (1957); Comment, Ninth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case
Law, 40 N.C.L. REV. 482, 532 (1962).
40. See e.g., Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946); Brown v. Brown, 224
N.C. 556, 31 S.E.2d 529 (1944); Davis v. Davis, 213 N.C. 537, 196 S.E. 819 (1938). In Stanley, the
judgment contained the following provision: "By consent, it is further ordered, adjudged and
decreed that this judgment shall in no way prejudice the defendant's rights to maintenance and
support under that certain agreement between the parties .. " 226 N.C. at 130-31, 37 S.E.2d at
119. The court held that this "hands off" provision was not sufficient to incorporate the terms of
the separation agreement into an order of the court. Id. at 134, 37 S.E.2d at 121. In Brown, the
judgment for absolute divorce contained the following provision: "[Tihis judgment shall not af-
fect or invalidate the deed of separation made and entered into by and between the plaintiff and
defendant." 224 N.C. at 557, 31 S.E.2d at 529. The court held that this provision did not consti-
tute a valid court order upon which the defendant could be held in contempt. Id. at 557, 31 S.E.2d
at 530. In Davis, the court merely acknowledged the separation agreement and attached a copy to
the divorce decree. 213 N.C. at 538, 196 S.E. at 820.
41. [When] the court merely approves or sanctions the payments which the husband has
agreed to make for the wife's support and sets them out in a judgment against him[,] [s]uch a
judgment constitutes nothing more than a contract between the parties made with the ap-
proval of the court ....
[and] is enforceable only as an ordinary contract.
Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 69, 136 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1964).
42. See, e.g., Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N.C. 181, 22 S.E.2d 576 (1942).
43. See, e.g., Dyer v. Dyer, 212 N.C. 620, 194 S.E. 576 (1942).
44. See, e.g., Stancil v. Stancil, 255 N.C. 507, 121 S.E.2d 882 (1972); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270
N.C. 253, 154 S.E.2d 71 (1967).
45. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule of Civil Proc. 68.1 (1969). Confession of Judgment
may be entered for alimony due or to become due under Rule 68.1(a), as long as the procedures
set out in Rule 68. 1 (b)-(d) are followed. One of these requirements is the defendant's authoriza-
tion to record the judgment. Under subsection (e), judgments by confession basically have the
same effect as any other judgment, and if the defendant fails to make the alimony payments, he
may be held in contempt. Id. Rule 68.1(e).
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which meant that a plaintiff was faced with the burden of successive
suits to enforce his or her right to alimony. When a defendant success-
fully avoided execution on the money judgments awarded in breach of
contract actions, the dependent spouse had no effective remedy. But
"[e]quity suffers no wrong to be without a remedy,"46 and now a court
may order specific performance of the contract and enforce its own or-
der through its contempt powers. The decree for specific performance
is the crucial intermediate step.
There has never been a reason for courts not to specifically enforce
separation contracts; there is no public policy ground offensive to
morals or to the well-being of the parties or any future parties.47
Courts in other jurisdictions generally have held that separation agree-
ments are enforceable by decrees of specific performance when reme-
dies at law are inadequate.48 Because "prediction" is the main concern
of this article, however, the important question is "How is it deter-
mined that a plaintiffs remedies at law are inadequate?" Admittedly,
it is difficult to formulate a positive rule as a guide in all cases because
whether the remedies at law are inadequate is a matter of fact.49 Per-
haps the best indicator of what the North Carolina Supreme Court will
do in the future can be gleaned from the sister state cases summarily
approved in Moore.5 ° These cases offer varying factors for determining
whether there are inadequate remedies at law, and in general take a
liberal approach in evaluating the need for specific performance of sep-
aration agreements.
I. FACTORS FOR DETERMINING INADEQUACY OF REMEDIES AT LAW
A. Mult~olicity of Actions
The necessity of multiple actions to recover alimony was one factor
that the Moore court deemed important in determining the inadequacy
of Ms. Moore's remedies at law." Moore follows the majority of juris-
dictions in accepting this as a major factor; 2 however, phrasing of the
standard differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The Moore court re-
46. 71 AM. JUR. Spec!fc Performance § 4, at 13 (2d ed. 1973), citing Manning v. Potomac
Electric Power Co., 230 Md. 415, 421, 187 A.2d 468, 471 (1963).
47. See Burke v. Burke, 32 Del. Ch. 320, 325, 86 A.2d 51, 54 (1952); Hagen v. Viney, 124 Fla.
747, 169 So. 391 (1936); Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 570, 158 A.2d 508, 519 (1960). All of
these cases were cited with approval in Moore.
48. See, e.g., Strasner v. Strasner, 232 Ark. 478, 338 S.W.2d 679 (1960); Peters v. Peters, 20
Del. Ch. 28, 169 A. 298 (1933); McAllister v. McAllister, 147 Fla. 647, 3 So. 2d 351 (1941); Edleson
v. Edleson, 179 Ky. 300, 200 S.W. 625 (1918); Richards v. Richards, 270 Mass. 113, 169 N.E. 891
(1930); Colburn v. Colburn, 279 Pa. 249, 123 A. 775 (1924).
49. See D. DOBBS, supra note 10, at 61.
50. See note 33 supra.
51. 297 N.C. at 18, 252 S.E.2d at 738. See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra.
52. See note 48 supra.
7
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lied on the Restatement of the Law of Contracts test,53 which requires
the "probability" of multiple actions as a basis for ordering specific
performance. In the District of Columbia case of Doelyler v. Doefler,54
cited in Moore, the mere "possibility" of successive actions was suffi-
cient to prompt the court to grant equitable relief.55 The Moore court's
failure to distinguish between these two formulations-the "possibil-
ity" or the "probability" of successive suits-should not prove trouble-
some as a practical matter, however. If a separation agreement
requires future periodic payments of spousal support, and if the de-
fendant has a history of defaults or otherwise indicates an unwilling-
ness to pay, it seems that a probability of multiple actions exists. In
Zouck v. Zouck,56 cited in Moore, the Maryland court's main concern
was the defendant's failure to make payments for five years, 7 indicat-
ing that a continued breach over a period of time is sufficient in itself
for a finding of inadequate remedies at law. Fleming v. Peterson,8 one
of the early cases ordering specific performance of a separation agree-
ment and approved in Moore, even created a presumption in favor of
the remedy when the defendant offered no excuse for his arrearages,
59
indicating that the slightest hint of unwillingness to pay is a sufficient
reason for a court to find that there is a probability of multiple actions
and that the remedies at law are inadequate.
B. Futility of Pursuing Remedies at Law
Mr. Moore concealed his assets and assigned his property to his sec-
ond wife,6" thereby making it futile for Ms. Moore to continue her
course of obtaining money judgments and issuing executions. Did the
court intend to limit the specific performance remedy only to cases in-
volving such egregious conduct? The court's reliance on Hagen v. Vi-
ney t indicates that such extreme circumstances are not necessary for a
53. See note 26 supra.
54. 196 A.2d 90 (D.C. App. 1963).
55. In Doerfier, the husband only threatened to reduce alimony payments provided for in
their separation agreement. The court decided that rather than possibly forcing the wife to bring
successive actions for judgments, the remedy of specific performance was more suitable. Id. at 91.
Cf. Riddle v. Riddle, 32 N.C. App. 83, 230 S.E.2d 809 (1977) (a pre-Moore case denying specific
performance when husband threatened to terminate alimony payments).
56. 204 Md. 285, 104 A.2d 573 (1954).
57. Id. at 290, 104 A.2d at 575. The defendant threw his copy of the separation agreement
into a trash can after leaving the attorney's office where it was executed. Id.
58. 167 I11. 465, 47 N.E. 755 (1897).
59. Appellant says it cannot be presumed that he would continue his refusal to pay, and
thus make so many suits necessary. We must take this case as the record presents it. He has
refused to pay without any reason or excuse for such refusal. . . . [W]e know of no reason
why it can be presumed that he will voluntarily pay hereafter.
Id. at 469, 47 N.E. at 756 (1897).
60. See note and text accompanying note 19 supra.
61. 124 Fla. 747, 169 So. 391 (1936).
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finding of inadequate remedies at law. In Hagen, the plaintiff merely
alleged that she had no personal knowledge of any property upon
which to execute if she were granted a money judgment, 62 and the
court accepted her allegation rather than require actual proof.63 The
Moore court did not state that a plaintiff must prove both the likeli-
hood of multiple actions and that the defendant is judgment-proof; the
existence of either factor should be sufficient to sustain a request for
specific performance.
C. D!ficulty of Service of Process
Hagen v. Viney 6  and Zouck v. Zouck 65 indicate that difficulty of
service of process66 can be an important factor in determining whether
remedies at law are inadequate. Although this factor was not present
in Moore, it should not be overlooked when it does exist.
II. BURDEN OF PROVING INADEQUACY OF REMEDIES AT LAW
The Moore court's concern with the lack of evidence regarding Mr.
Moore's willingness to make payments67 and the absence of any justifi-
cation for his arrearages indicates that some burden will be on the de-
fendant to prove that the plaintiff's remedies at law are adequate. The
rationales of several cases from other jurisdictions cited with approval
in Moore indicate that this burden is initially on the defendant. In
Doerfler v. Doerfler,6 s the court held that in the absence of any showing
that it would be inequitable, the court would enforce separation agree-
ments by specific performance decrees. 69 Recall that in Fleming v. Pe-
terson70 a presumption in favor of specific performance arose when the
defendant offered no excuse for arrearages.7' The Massachusetts
Supreme Court granted specific performance in Lorant v. Lorant72 be-
cause the husband failed to allege that the wife's remedies at law were
62. Id. at 752, 169 So. at 393.
63. Id. at 756-57, 169 So. at 395.
64. 124 Fla. 747, 169 So. 391 (1936).
65. 204 Md. 285, 104 A.2d 573 (1954).
66. Mr. Hagen was a successful professional golfer. His income from his profession and
royalties was over $50,000.00 annually in 1936 dollars! Because he traveled around the United
States and Canada secreting himself when in New Jersey, the court required him to post security
for his appearance or performance of the decree. 124 Fla. at 752, 169 So. at 393. Mrs. Zouck had
been unable to serve her husband with process because he traveled as an engineer in the United
States and abroad. 204 Md. at 290-91, 104 A.2d at 575.
67. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
68. 196 A.2d 90 (D.C. App. 1963).
69. Id. at 91.
70. 167 Ill. 465, 47 N.E. 755 (1897).
71. Id. at 465, 47 N.E. at 756.
72. 366 Mass. 380, 318 N.E.2d 830 (1974).
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inadequate.73 Although the Moore court did not state that the entire
burden of proving the adequacy of remedies at law would be on the
defendant, it did indicate that proof of a defendant's willingness to
make payments is an important factor in determining whether to issue
a decree for specific performance.74 It may prove to be the determining
factor in deciding whether to order specific performance of future pay-
ments.
III. NECESSITY OF FIRST PURSUING REMEDIES AT LAW
Because Ms. Moore had unsuccessfully pursued every available rem-
edy at law,75 the court did not speak directly to this important issue.
Cases from other jurisdictions cited in Moore indicate that North Caro-
lina courts may follow their view in the future and not require a plain-
tiff to pursue remedies at law before seeking equitable relief.
Some of the cited cases do not require a showing that a plaintiffs
legal remedies are in fact inadequate. In Strasner v. Strasner,6 an Ar-
kansas Supreme Court case, the remedies at law for breach of separa-
tion agreements were found "inherently" inadequate.77 In Lorant v.
Lorant,7 8 the Massachusetts Supreme Court granted an alternative plea
for specific performance without finding that the plaintiff had inade-
quate remedies at law.79 However, because the Moore decision to
grant equitable relief was grounded on a finding of inadequate reme-
dies at law, it is improbable that the North Carolina courts will grant
equitable relief as a matter of course. Instead, upon a showing of the
probability or possibility of multiple suits,"0 the difficulty of service of
process,8' or the futility of pursuing remedies at law because there is no
property upon which to execute,82 the courts probably will grant a de-
cree for specific performance without requiring that the plaintiff first
pursue his or her remedies at law.
IV. CREATION BY CONTRACT OF THE RIGHT TO SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE
Can the parties create a right to specific performance by private
agreement? It is not apparent whether such an agreement would be
73. Id. at 386, 318 N.E.2d at 834.
74. 297 N.C. at 18, 252 S.E.2d at 739.
75. See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra.
76. 232 Ark. 478, 338 S.W.2d 679 (1960).
77. Id. at 481-82, 338 S.W.2d at 681.
78. 366 Mass. 380, 318 N.E.2d 830 (1974).
79. Id. at 386, 318 N.E.2d at 834.
80. See text accompanying notes 51-59 supra.
81. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
82. See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
216
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binding on the court, and the argument could be made that such an
agreement would be an attempt to usurp the inherent jurisdiction of the
court to determine whether specific performance is appropriate. 83 Be-
cause Moore is grounded on the inadequacy of the remedies at law, it is
doubtful that the North Carolina courts would summarily issue decrees
for specific performance even though the remedy was provided for
within the terms of the separation agreement. A court, however, may
give some weight to such a provision even though it would not fore-
close its own discretion.84 Perhaps a provision accompanied by a
description of those particular factors that made specific performance a
desirable remedy for the parties would carry even more weight than a
provision merely approving specific performance as a remedy.85 Al-
though such a provision would not bind the court, it may tend to re-
duce the number of breaches and, therefore, the number of time-
consuming and expensive lawsuits.
V. CONCLUSION
As a matter of public policy, courts generally favor enforcement of
separation agreements.86 "[W]hen a husband and wife have deter-
mined to go their separate ways, they should be encouraged to settle
their own affairs by a separation agreement ...."I' Perhaps the ob-
stacles previously encountered in enforcing separation agreements
88
have been obviated by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Moore,
and that "regardless of how the domestic settlement is structured, the
end result will be" that the parties must comply with the terms of their
agreement. 89 For Moore to reach its full potential, however, North
Carolina courts should interpret the decision as favoring specific per-
formance as a remedy for the enforcement of separation agreements.
The persistence and patience of Ms. Moore should not be required of
future plaintiffs and deliberate avoidance of legal remedies should be
discouraged. By granting equitable relief if the remedies at law ap-
pear doubtful or less certain than the remedies in equity, 9° North Car-
83. See McNeil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 520-23
(1962). Few cases have raised this question and there is no clear answer. D. DOBBS, supra note
10, at 825.
84. This would be true especially if the remedy at law was doubtful. D. DOBBS, supra note
10, at 825.
85. See Kronan, supra note 22, at 371.
86. See note 47 supra.
87. Doerfler v. Doerfier, 196 A.2d 90, 91 (D.C. App. 1963) (cited with approval in Moore).
88. See text accompanying notes 35-45 supra.
89. R. Riddle, Enforcement of Separation Agreements & Court Orders (Aug. 24, 1979) (pa-
per prepared for the Family Law Seminar sponsored by the N.C. Academy of Trial Lawyers).
90. If the subject matter of a contract cannot be duplicated or if obtaining a substantial
equivalent involves difficulty, delay, and inconvenience, the court will generally be more apt to
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olina courts can prevent financial hardships like those suffered by Ms.
Moore. After all, successive awards of money damages, no matter how
successful the plaintiff may be in executing upon property of a breach-
ing defendant, cannot be the duplicate or even the substantial
equivalent of the periodic payments bargained for in a separation
agreement.
Jo HILL DOBBINS
compel specific performance. See A. CORBIN, supra note 22, at § 1142; Kronan, supra note 22, at
356.
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